The Private Security Forces in Syria (Area 51 Resilient Rating Global Outlook 02)

RESILIENT RATING©

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Area 51 Global Outlook 02 / 15-03-2019

1- The Strategic Contest:

Using the Legislative Decree 55/2013 Iran, Russia and Syrian power brokers are drilling the transformation of Syria from a “shadow state” into a “transactional state”.

Here we are talking about the growing power of the private political military power, a parallel power generated by the  Private Security Forces that are also a Non State Actor,(NSA).

A parallel militay power that is an integration of that created either by the State-sponsored Militias and the State-alligned Militias.

Bat also an evolution because this trend underlines that a new political tool is entering inside the Syrian equation of power and we can describe this new variable as the Political Parallel “Private” Military Power, (P3MP).

This trend magnifies:

  • either the transformation of Syria into a transactional state where the powers mantain the form but deeply change their function, capacity and agency
  • and the real weakness of the regime that could run a war but it is not ready to handle the stabilization-building of the country

2- The Tactical Contest:

At the moment we have 72 authorized companies and the 3 biggest ones are:

Castle Security & Protection, (CSP), under the Iranian control and located in the Mezzen District.ì with a a fixed observation point in the area of the Sayyidah Raqqiya Mosque.

Top Clients:

CSP protects the Shia pilgrims from the Damascus airport to religious centers.

Inside the Iran-Med Corridors secures the passage of commercial goods from the Tartous port to Damascus, Hothatms and Aleppo.

CPS protects the Iranian huge investements to build thousands of residential units in the suburbs of Syria’s capital, Damascus. We are talking about around 200.000 residential units according to Iraj Rahbar, vice president of Iran’s Mass Construction Society. It is part of a memorandum of understanding signed by Teheran and Damascus in January 2019.

In one  sentence: looking at the huge Iranian investments inside the Iran-Med Corridor and to the deep as well as strctured links with the local new power brokers. Last week the Israeli government mentioned about an agreement with Russia where Moscow will not allow foreigners, (to read Iran and Hizbollah), to stay in Syria.

Due to  this real aggregate of power and interests, (either poltical and economic), it is hard to believe that Moscow can force Theran to leave. And  we have also to add the Iranian-Hizbollah presence for their own geo-strategic interests inside the  Iran-Med Corridor as well as that of a parallel army of around 50.000 fighters  trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp and it will be integrated inside the Syrian Army.

Al-Sharouq Company for Security Services, (ASCSS), under the Russian Control located in the al-Shaalan district.

Top Clients:

The Bemo Bank, Bank of Syria and Overseas, al-Baraka Bank, the Syria International Islamic Bank, the al-Safir Hotel in Homs,  the Hisyah Industrial City and the opening of the Emirati embassy in Syria.

To ACCSS we have to add the military power generated by the Russian private security forces Wagner with around 4.000 professionals and owned by a senior officer of the Russian Army deeply linked to the President Putin’s deep state.

The combined power, (Wagner and ACCSS), is the Russian Political Parallel “Private” Military Power, (P3MP), in Syria.

Qasioun, owned by Rami Maklhouf  that is the maternal cousin of President Bashar al-Assad an one of the Syria’s wealthiest  and most powerfull man.

Top Clients:

The best of the existing economic structure in the country.

3- The Meaning:

The Private Security Forces, (PSF), are not only a source of military power but also a political subject on itself being a Non State Actor.

We must keep this on mind to full understand the implications derivated by the fact that the PFS’s in Syria not fit either the ISO 18788 ad the ICoCa Ethic and Operative Code.

On practical terms this means that the PSF’s in Syria not fit the international standards neither in terms of management nor in terms of  ethic.

But this dimension is totally irrilevant for the masterminds behind them because they want something else.

What do they want?

Before to introduce this topic we must  focus to an important detail: the operative cost.

The PSF’s  pay  wages ranging between 150 and 250 pounds per hour, without any contracts.

That means on average 0.40 euro cents per hour  and if we consider 8 hours for the working day that means 3.2€/day.

Then to fund 30.000 Syrian professionals will cost only 35.040.000 €/year.

An ammount of money that Iran, Russia as well as wealty Syrian Politicians can afford to pay.

The consequences are clear.

And it is also clear that thanks to this law, (the Decree 55/2013), and to this volume of costs it will be also possible to fund local Militias in a project to stabilize the country.

Local Militias that will work along with the Syrian PFS’s and the International PSF’s that will respect either the ISO 18788 and the ICoCA Code.

They can supply the military power for the stabilization-building that no country wants to offer and all must be under the UN supervision.

In a sentence: the needed military power that no one wants to supply because no one wants to pay the related political costs, (either internal and international).

Funded by an International Consortium composed not only by Countries acting as international donors but also by Multinationals, (another Non State Actor), involved inside the Belt and Roads Initiative.

About this solution we will talk in the future inside a Resilient Rating Pop-Paper.

Paolo Dealberti©2019

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Declaration of Conflicting Interestes: 

The Author declared not potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article

Funding:

The Author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article

 


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